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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN, 
husband and wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants 
Cross-Defendants and Respon-
dents, 
LUTHER EUGD!E JONES and BETTY 
ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife, 
vs. 
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,: 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-
Party Counter-Defendants and 
Ap-pellants, 
0. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN 
STILSON, U:--!I TED FARM AGENCY, a 
Utah corporation, 
VS. 
Third-Party Defendants, 
Counter-Claimants, Fourth-
Party Plaintiffs, and Respon-
dents, 
CARL C. DUG~~ and LOUISE DUGAN 
husband and wife, 
Fourth-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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husband and wife, 
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Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants 
Cross-Defendants and Respon-
dents, 
, LUTHER EUGENE JONES and BETTY 
' ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife, 
vs. 
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,: 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Third-
Party Counter-Defendants and 
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STILSON, UNITED FARM AGENCY, a 
Utah corporation, 
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Counter-Claimants, Fourth-
Party Plaintiffs, and Respon-
dents, 
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Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
~ATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 11656 
This is a foreclosure action in which a counter-claim and 
third-party claims for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of duty 
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and negligence were brought by the Appellants. The action arose 
out of the sale, pursuant to a mortgage and trust deed, of real 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried, without a jury, before Fourth District 
Judge J. Robert Bullock. The court ordered foreclosure of the 
plaintiff-respondents' mortgage and denied the defendant, counte~ 
claimant, third-party plaintiffs-appellants any relief on their 
causes of action sounding in fraud, misrepresentation, breach of 
duty and negligence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek a reversal of the order of foreclosure n 
a judgment for appellants on their claims for relief. In the 
alternative, the appellants seek a remand to the District Court fu 
a jury trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises out of certain real estate transactions 
involving Carl C. and Louise Dugan, the plaintiffs, counterclaim 
defendants and respondents and Betty and Luther Jones the defen· 
dants, counterclaimants, third-party plaintiffs and appellants. 
B. Oberhansly, Lester Clan Stilson and United Farm Agency are the 
third-party defendants and respondents. 
-2-
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se In February, 1972 Oberhansly entered into a listing agreement 
with Carl C. Dugan for property owned by the Dugans located in 
Jensen, Utah. This listing specified that the property consisted 
of 22 3/4 acres, 18 acres of which were tillable. Twelve (12) 
:t acres were specified as being pasture and 8 acres were listed as 
being irrigated. 
~er· In early 1973, the Joneses resided in Morgan Hills, Cali-
fornia. (Tr. 98) They obtained a copy of the Spring 1973 United 
Jf Farm Agency Real Estate Catalog. (Tr. 100) Contained in this 
catalog was an advertisement for the property listed by the 
~gans. The property was advertised as having 22 acres, 18 
an. tillable, and 8 irrigated, having 1/4 mile river frontage. (Pl. 
Ex. 9) In reliance on this advertisement the Joneses contacted 
fu ~erhansly in January, 1973 and subsequently travelled from their 
home in California to meet with Oberhansly. (Tr. 103) Oberhansly 
showed them the property and reiterated the substance of the 
advertisement in the catalog and listing. In reliance on Mr. 
m I Oberhansly's representations, the Joneses made an offer to purchase 
the property and executed a Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale 
o. (Def. Ex. 5) which was later signed by the Dugans and by the 
he Joneses. (Tr. lll-113) This document stated the amount of 
property as 22 3/4 acres. (Tr. lll-112) 
At the time of the execution of the Deposit Receipt and 
~reement of Sale, the Joneses verbally expressed to Oberhansly a 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
condition that the sellers either release from the mortgage a 
parcel large enough for the Joneses to erect a new home or sub-
ordinate their mortgage on a parcel of the land in order for the 
Joneses to secure financing for the construction of a new home. 
Oberhansly confirmed the Dugans' agreement to this verbal condit~ 
by a letter to the Joneses. (Tr. 115, 116) (Def. Ex. 11) 
Pursuant to the terms of the Deposit Receipt and Agreement ~ 
Sale, the Dugans tendered a warranty deed which did not state the 1 
' 
' 
number of acres of land being conveyed to the Joneses. The war- ' 
ranty deed, in fact, conveyed a parcel of real property containi~~l 
less than seven acres rather than 22 3/4 acres as set forth in t~ 
Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale. (De£. Ex. 10) (Tr. 95) I 
The Joneses, in reliance on the representations of the Dugans and! 
Oberhansly as to the size of the parcel of property conveyed, 
executed a mortgage and promissory note. (Tr. 124) The Joneses 
took possession of the property unaware of the missing acreage. t 
approximately May, 1974, after making a deposit on a pre-fabricatecl 
home of $500.00, (Def. Ex. 14) the Joneses learned that no parcel 
of land had been released by the Dugans and that Oberhansly's 
statement in his letter was false. (Tr. 123) Because of this non·'! 
release, the Joneses were prevented from purchasing or 
a new dwelling on this property. 
.. 1 
cons tructln'l 
I 
I 
The Joneses had told the Dugans and Oberhansly that their 
reason for purchasing said property was for the construction of a 
-4-
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campground. (Tr. 105-106) In September, 1976, after having the 
~- appropriate individuals inspect the property for a campground 
:he franchise, the Joneses learned of the large discrepency in the 
acreage (less than seven acres instead of 22 3/4 acres). (Tr. 133) 
it~ They contacted legal counsel who wrote a letter to the Dugans 
t oi 
the 1 
r-
' 
' 
' 
ningll 
the 
: .• I 
advising them that due to the discrepency the payments would be 
paid into an escrow account until the acreage discrepency could be 
straightened out. (Tr. 138) 
On January 19, 1977, the Dugans filed an action to foreclose 
on the property sold to the Joneses. (R. 1) The Joneses answered 
the Dugans' complaint and filed a counterclaim against the 
Dugans and a third-party complaint against United Farm Agency, 
Stilson and Oberhansly. The counterclaim and third-party complaint 
alleged, in part, causes of action for fraud, misrepresentation, 
ls breach of duty, and negligence. (R. 15- 31) 
1: 
:a tee\ 
·eel 
non·\, 
. I tlnil 
I 
I 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE A JURY 
DETERMINE THE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN 
THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUD, NEGLI-
GENCE, MISREPRESENTATION AND BREACH OF 
DUTY. 
On September 15, 1978, the appellants made a demand for a jury 
trial. (R.l56,157) The third-party defendants objected to the 
demand for jury trial on the grounds that the issues in the case 
1 were primarily equitable. (R.l58,159) The Fourth District Court 
- 5-
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declined to grant a trial by jury. The court cited State Bank 
of Lehi vs. Woolsey, 565 P.Zd 413 (Utah 1977) as authority for 
its decision. (R.l61) 
The Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 10, declares 
that "a jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded". 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-21-1 (1953) allows a right to jury 
trial as follows: 
In actions for the recovery of specific 
real or personal property, with or without 
damages, or for money claimed as due 
upon a contract, or as damages for breach 
of contract, or for injuries, an issue 
of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a 
jury trial is waived or a reference is 
ordered. 
The Joneses made no waiver of a jury trial and the court 
ordered no reference. The appellants, therefore, met the statu-
tory requirements for a jury trial. 
The difference between State Bank of Lehi, supra., and the 
case at bar is in the relief prayed for by the respective defen-
dants. In State Bank of Lehi, the defendants requested relief w~ 
based on the security interest being foreclosed on by the plain-
tiffs. In the present case, the Joneses are not asserting that 
the foreclosure or the defenses raised in opposition to the fore-
closure are questions for a jury. However, the factual issues 
raised by the causes of action alleging fraud, negligence, mis-
representation and breach of duty are questions for a jury. These; 
-6-
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ny 
1-
was 
e-
questions of fact, independent of the validity of the interest 
being foreclosed on, should have been submitted to a jury. These 
questions clearly distinquish the case at bar from State Bank 
of Lehi. 
The fact that a case involves equitable issues does not pre-
vent a jury from determining the legal issues of fact. The United 
States Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres, Inc. vs. Westover, 79 
S.Ct. 948, 359 U.S. 500, 3 L.Ed. 2d 988, (1959) in addressing the im-
portance of scrutinizing the denial of right to a jury trial stated 
in a quotation from a previous case: 
'Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding 
body is of such importance and occupies so firm 
a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial 
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.' 
Dimich v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486, 55 S.Ct. 
296, 301, 79 L.Ed 603. 
It does not matter that the Dugans sued for foreclosure first. The 
court in Beacon, supra., stated: 
It follows that if Beacon would have been 
entitled to a jury trial in a treble 
damage suit against Fox it cannot be de-
prived of that right merely because Fox 
took advantage of the availability of 
declaratory relief to sue Beacon first. 
Later in Dairy Queen, Inc. vs. Wood 369 U.S. 467, 472 (1962), 
, 82 S.Ct. 894, the court held: 
ese , 
- 7-
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At the outset, we may dispose of one of 
the grounds upon which the trial court acted in 
striking the demand for trial by jury -- that 
based upon the view that the right to trial by 
jury may be lost as to legal issues where those 
issues are characterized as 'incidental' to 
equitable issues. 
The procedure rules the court used as their reasons for determinin:
1 
Dairy Queen, supra, and Beacon are virtually identical to Utah's. 
In Hightower vs. Bigoney, 156 So. Zd 501 (Florida 1963), under 
similar facts, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the defen·! 
dant to a foreclosure action who had counterclaimed for negligen~ 1 
I 
had stated a clear case for a common-law action. They noted thatci 
l federal and state constitutions guaranteed a right to a trial by a 1 
jury in such cases and held that the filing of a compulsory counte1 
claim for relief cognizable at law in an action for equitable relie 
did not constitute a waiver to the right to a jury trial. 
Beacon, Dairy Queen, Hightower, the Constitution of Utah and 
Utah Code Annotated 78-21-1 (1953) all provide for a jury trial 
under the circumstances of the present case. Neither a predominan:t 
issue test nor a first action filed test applies to determining 
whether a jury trial is required. A party is entitled to a jury 
i 
to decide factual questions arising out of claims or defenses his-' 
torically being issues of law. The appellants should have been 
granted a jury trial on the factual issues raised by the claims 
fraud, misrepresentation and breach of duty. 
- 8-
I 
I 
fo: 
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POINT II. 
THE APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED 
TO CALL EXPERT WITNESSES AT TRIAL TO 
AID THE TRIER OF FACT IN THE DETERMINATION 
OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. 
On January 24, 197~ a pre-trial was held where extensive 
nin:, discussion among the three attorneys took place. During this 
s. discussion a disclosure of the appellants' experts fifteen (15) 
.nde; days prior to trial was requested and ordered as part of the pre-
n· \ trial order. No written pre-trial order was ever prepared nor 
n~ 1 was this required disclosure made a part of the court's minute 
atci entry. The trial in this matter did not occur until December 5, 
'i 
y a
1 
1978. Due to failure to reduce the order to writing and the 
ntei long delay between the pre-trial and the trial, the appellants did 
elie not disclose their experts. No further oral or written communi-
cation regarding this requirement took place after the oral 
~ statements of January 24, 1978, until trial. At trial, the court 
granted a motion by the third-party defendants-respondents' counsel, 
nan:[ to deny the appellants the right to call experts to testify as to 
y 
is- ! 
I 
I 
fo: 
I 
the amount of damages. 
Rules 7(b)(2) and (4) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
state: 
(2) Orders. An order includes every 
direction of the court including a minute 
order made and entered in writing and 
not included in a judgment. An order 
for the payment of money may be enforced 
by execution in the same manner as if it 
were a judgment. Except as otherwise 
-9-
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specifically provided by these rules, 
any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified 
without notice by the judge who made it, 
or may be vacated or modified on notice. 
* * * 
(4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders, 
and Other Papers. The rules applicable to 
captions, signing, and other matters of form 
of pleadings apply to all motions, orders, 
and other papers provided for by these rules. 
It would appear that an order to be an order must comply 
with this section which requires that it be in writing. In the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rul~ 7 there is no separate 
delineation of order in the heading or body of the rule. It is 
not specifically mentioned as it is in the Utah rules. This 
suggests that the Utah framers in making this addition speci-
fically meant for orders to be in writing. Of note is that 
agreements which are not to be performed within a year are 
required by the Statute of Frauds, UCA 25-5-4, to be void unless 
in writing. Here the time involved was almost one year from pre-
trial to trial. The reason for this rule was, of course, the 
protection from the dangers of a fading memory. 
Rule 16(5) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposi-
tion of the action. The court shall make an 
order which recites the action taken at the con-
ference, the amendments allowed to the plead-
- 10-
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ings, and the agreements made by the parties 
as to any of the matters considered, and which 
limits the issues for trial to those not dis-
posed of by admissions or agreements of coun-
sel; and such order when entered controls the 
subsequent course of the action, unless modi-
fied at the trial to prevent manifest injus-
tice. . (Emphasis added.) 
In formulation of this rule controlling the course of the 
action, it was acknowledged the need for it to be modified at 
trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court's Finding of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 12, states: 
12. There was no competent evidence intro-
duced from which the Court could award more 
than nominal damages to the third-party 
Plaintiff and the Court finds that the proper 
measure of damages is the difference between 
the value of the property if it had been as 
represented and its actual value. 
The Joneses' testimony as to the difference in value of the 
property as represented and actually received (Tr. 135) as shown 
by this paragraph given was completely discounted. This demon-
strates that the court required expert testimony as to the amount 
of damages, yet would not allow it to be given. This allowance 
of the oral pre-trial order to control was a manifest injustice. 
In Soliz vs. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11,13, 395 P.2d 25 (1964) 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of rebuttal testimony. 
There they said: 
The party who has the affirmative burden 
of proof is required to produce the first 
-11-
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evidence on an issue, and at that time should 
produce all his evidence in chief. Then after 
his adversary has produced all his evidence, the 
former should be confined to rebuttal evidence 
or evidence which tends to answer or explain 
his adversary's evidence. 
Assuming arguendo that the oral pre-trial order was valid, the· 
the Joneses properly introduced all the allowable evidence concern;·/ 
the value of the building in question. 
The purpose of the pre-trial order was to prevent the opposi~! 
testimony offered by expert witnesses. This purpose lost its 
that 
1 
parties from being unable to offer testimony in opposition to 
importance when the Dugans admitted testinony on the value of the 
building. The Joneses attempted to offer rebuttal testimony by 
Mr. Carroll. The court disallowed this testimony, thereby depriving 
the Joneses of their rights to offer rebuttal testimony as re-
quired by Soliz. 
There the appellants contended that the trial court erred in 
failing to limit the testimony to a rebuttal of evidence introducei 
on behalf of the respondent. In the case at bar the court never 
allowed the rebuttal testimony. 
The disparity in the value of the building was a critical 
issue at trial. (Tr. 135, 246) A denial by the court to hear 
testimony intended to answer evidence presented by the Dugans was 
prejudicial. 
- 12-
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POINT III. 
THE APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE 
COHPETENT WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO THE VALUE 
OF THEIR PROPERTY. 
There is no question that Utah allows owners of property to 
testify as competent witnesses to the value of their real property. 
In State of Utah vs. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 186, 478 P.2d 
507 (1970), the court stated: 
Hr. Dillree being an owner of the prop-
erty, together with his wife, was a 
competent witness as to the value of 
the property taken and as to severance 
damages incurred. 
In Provo River Water Users' Assn. vs. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 
l 0 4 , 13 3 P . 2 d 1 7 7 7 ( 19 4 3) the court said : 
As to the qualifications of defendant 
Carlson, there is no merit to the 
contention that he was not competent 
to give an opinion as to value of his 
property. An owner of property is al-
ways entitled to testify as to its 
value, and to express an opinion as to 
its value in condemnation proceedings. 
An owner does not have to qualify as 
an expert, nor be engaged in buying and 
selling real estate. 
See also State of Utah vs. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 
P.Zd 860 (1964); Utah State Road Commission vs. Steele Rand, 533 P.2d 
838 (1975); Williams vs. Oldroyd, 581 P.Zd 561 Utah (1978); and 
~derson vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 583 P.2d 101, Utah (1978). 
1 
Both the appellants and plaintiff-respondents presented evidence as to 
the value of the buildings and property. (Tr. 135,246) This 
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evidence, according to the cases cited above, constituted competent 
evidence. 
Betty Jones, in testifying as to the value of the buildings 
and property, relied on the opinion of Howard Carroll, an appraiser; 
the opinion of other real estate professionals; and Mrs. Jones' 
knowledge of property values. The basis of Mr. Dugan's testimony 
was not clearly established. However, Mr. Dugan's testimony 
(the value of the land being $10,000), when reduced to a per acre 
value, is that the land is worth approximately $1,600 per acre. Thi! 
value is very close to the value testified to by Mrs. Jones. The 
court should have given considerable weight to the testimony of Mrs. 
Jones and Mr. Dugan as to the value of the land. In short, with-
out any additional evidence being received, there was competent 
evidence of the value of the property. 
POINT IV. 
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANTS OWED A DUTY TO THIRD-PARTY PLAIN-
TIFFS WHICH WAS BREACHED AND RESULTED IN 
DAMAGES TO THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS. 
The laws of the State of Utah create a monopoly for brokers 
and salesmen of real estate by requiring that a license be obtained 
from the Securities Commission. Section 61-2-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953), as amended provides: 
-u-
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It shall be unlawful for any person ... 
to engage in the business, act in the 
capacity of, advertise or assume to act 
as a real estate broker or a real estate 
salesman within this state without 
first obtaining a license under the 
provisions of this chapter. 
The Statute also provides the criteria that must be considered 
before any person can obtain a license. Section 61-2-6(a),UCA, 
(1953), as amended, states: 
It shall be the duty and responsi-
bility of the Board of Real Estate 
Examiners to determine the qualifi-
cations and requirements and to pre-
scribe the type and content of the 
examination to be passed by every 
applicant for a real estate broker's 
or salesman's license. With due 
regard for the paramount interest 
of the public, the Board of Real Es-
tate Examiners may require and pass 
upon such proof as may be deemed 
necessary to determine the honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, 
and competency of each applicant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Further stating in Section b: 
Such application shall be ac-
companied by the recommendation 
of at least three citizens who 
have been for three years and are 
now real property owners . . . 
certifying that the applicant 
bears a good reputation for honesty 
and trustworthiness. 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is clear from the foregoing Statutes that the purpose of 
the licensing Board is to determine, in regards to the paramount 
interest of the public, the competency, honesty, and integrity of 
each real estate broker or salesman so that the public, in gen-
eral, can rely on that determination. It is also exceedingly 
clear that a person obtaining a broker's or salesman's license 
must continue to exemplify these virtues of competency, honesty, 
integrity, and trustworthiness. Each member of the public relies 
on the fact that he has a license and is trained to deal in real 
estate. 
Section 61-2-11(7) UCA (1953), as amended, gives the Securities 
Commission the authority to revoke real estate licenses if the 
licensee violates the duty owed to the public. This duty is 
emphasized when the brokers have greater experience in land 
dealings and the purchasers place confidence in their representation, 
In Lewis vs. White, 2 Utah 2d, 101, 296 P.2d 865, (1954), the 
Court stated: 
.On the other hand, the wide difference 
in experience and business acumen, and 
the degree to which Mrs. White placed 
confidence in Mr. Lewis and relied upon 
his representations are things which the 
jury could take into consideration on 
the question of fraud. . 2 U.2d at 103. 
TUtah law, therefore creates a duty owing from any salesman 
or broker to the public who deal with such broker or salesman. 
-16-
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ies 
ion, 
Each member of the public when dealing with a salesman or broker 
relies on the fact that each salesman or broker is licensed and 
as such, is qualified to serve them competently and adequately. 
The broker or salesman is estopped from denying any such duty. 
Many jurisdictions recognize a duty running from the sales-
man and broker to the purchaser. In Zichlin vs. Dill et ex., 25 
So. 2d 4 (1946), the Florida Supreme Court in a case similar to 
the one at bar, held that a broker owes a duty to the buyer as 
well as his principal. In that case the brokers were required, 
by statutes similar to Utah Code Annotated, 61-2-1 et. seq., to have 
a license before engaging in the real estate business. 
ing down the rule of caveat emptor, the Court stated: 
The broker in this state belongs to a 
privileged class and enjoys a monopoly 
to engage in a lucrative business. See 
section 475.01 et seq. Fla. Stat. 41. F.S.A. 
The statute requr~es that (475.17): 
' .All applicants who are natural per-
sons shall be competent, honest, truthful, 
trustworthy, of good character and bear 
a reputation for fair dealing, ... ' The 
state, therefore has prescribed a high 
standard of qualifications and by the same 
law granted a form of monopoly and in so 
doing the old rule of caveat emptor is 
cast aside. Those dealing with a licensed 
broker may naturally assume that he pos-
sesses the requisites of an honest, ethical 
man. 25 So. Zd at 4-5. 
In strik-
The Florida court recognized that the state statutes create 
a higher standard of qualification and competency and that those 
dealing with such licensed individuals have the right to rely on 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
those high qualifications and accept information given by them as 
true. 
Oregon has also recognized this duty when the seller's agent 
is dealing with the buyer. In Greig vs. Interstate Investment 
Co., 253 P. 877 (1927) where the plaintiff-buyer was dealing 
solely with the seller's agent, the court stated that "the evi-
dence tends to show a relation between the plaintiff and the 
defendant Ross bordering very closely to being a fiduciary." The 
facts of Greig are very similar to the present case. In both 
cases, the buyer was limited to dealings with the seller's agent 
and no one else. In both cases the buyer had to negotiate with 
the seller's agent if he wanted to buy that particular piece of 
property. In both cases a relationship existed that required a 
high degree of trust. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized this duty and has 
extended it to brokers with greater experience in land dealings. 
In Motter vs. Bateman, 18 Utah 2d 335, 338 (1967) Pac. citation the 
court stated: 
.We recognize the principle that where there 
is a significant disparity of intelligence 
or experience by which one party is able to 
take advantage of the other, the fact may be 
considered. 
See also Lewis vs. 1fui te, supra. 
In the present case the third-party defendants had been in 
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the real estate business for many years and were licensed to 
deal in real estate. (Tr. 86,204) The Joneses had engaged in 
only one purchase of property in Utah, (the Jensen, Utah property) and 
were not experienced in land dealings. The Joneses relied on the United 
Farm Agency and Oberhansly's license as being a guarantee of 
their honesty and competency. Because of third-party defendants' 
expert knowledge and experience and the Joneses' reliance on this 
knowledge and experience, the third-party defendants are estopped 
to assert that they had no duty to act in a competent and trust-
worthy manner. United Farm Agency and Oberhansly are bound by the 
statutes and must act in furtherance of the public interest by 
conducting all business in a competent and trustworthy manner. 
Stilson admits that he owes a duty to the buyers as though the 
buyer were the principal of the Agency. In Stilson's direct 
testimony before the Security Commission of the State of Utah 
Real Estate Division on Friday December 17, 1976 at 1:00 p.m., he 
states on page 72 of the transcript: 
... We try to work so that we work for 
the benefit of our clients and to help our 
buyer, we bring them in from long distances, 
we try to represent them and do the very 
best job that we can~Emphasis added.) 
(R.83) 
It is clear from Stilson's testimony that he recognizes the duty 
that is owing to the buyer and that this duty must be fulfilled. 
In the case at bar, United Farm Agency is a nationwide 
company which specializes in farm, ranch and recreation property. 
fStilson dep. P.6, L.ZS) The majority of this property sold 
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through United Farm Agency in Utah is recreational. This is 
mainly in 5 to 10 acre lots. (Stilson dep. P.7, L.l-8) Oberhans~ 
averages approximately twenty transactions a year on behalf of 
United Farm Agency which involve acreage in excess of ten acres. 
(Tr. 203) He took the listing on the subject property on February 
11, 1972. The Joneses did not come to see the property until 
over a year later. (Tr 204). Oberhansly had in excess of one 
year to make a determination as to the accuracy of his represen-
tations as to the amount of acreage involved. 
specialty is acreage in excess of 10 acres. 
Oberhansly's 
(Tr. 203) He 
admits he prepared an inaccurate listing from which the advertise-
ment was prepared. (Tr. 206, 208) This listing showed the 
acreage as 22 3/4. (Def. Ex. 7) Oberhansly admits that it 
looked more like 6 acres (Tr. 211) than 22 3/4 acres. (Tr. 212). 
Oberhansly knew that the Joneses would not purchase the 
acreage unless a building lot was released. Oberhansly wrote 
them a letter (Def. Ex. 11) stating that a building lot would be 
released from the mortgage by Dugan and a second mortgage taken 
on that piece of land. (Tr. 211) All these actions or inactions 
taken by Oberhansly were fraudulent or reckless. 
Since United Farms' listings are exclusive (Def. Ex. 7), the 
Joneses could only deal with Oberhansly. This makes Oberhansly's 
duty to the Joneses, as laymen, much higher than the duty existing 
in a non-exclusive listing situation. Oberhansly became the 
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Joneses only representative in dealing with the Dugans. This 
duty is akin to the fiduciary duty owed the Dugans. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 
329 P.2d 410 (1948) stated: 
... the relationship of real estate agent 
and client makes the situation quite dif-
ferent. The agent is issued a license and 
permitted to hold himself out to the public 
as qualified by training and experience to 
render a specialized service in the field 
of real estate transactions. There rests 
upon him the responsibility of honesty in 
fairly representing the interests of those 
who engage his services, and upon failing 
to do so his license may be revoked. Ac-
cordingly, persons who entrust their busi-
ness to such agents are entitled to repose 
some degree of confidence that they will 
be loyal to such trust and that they will, 
with reasonable diligence and in good faith, 
represent the interests of their client. 
Unless the law demands such standard, in-
stead of being the badge of competence and 
integrity it is supposed to be, the license 
would serve only as a foil to lure the un-
suspecting public into being duped by people 
more skilled and experienced in such affairs 
than are they, when they would be better off 
in taking care of such business for them-
selves. 329 P.2d 412. 
In discussing the fiduciary relationship which arises be-
tween the real estate agent and his client, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Because of the snecialized service the real 
estate broker offers in acting as an agent 
for his client, there arises a fiduciary 
-21-
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relationship between them; it is incumbent 
upon him to apply his abilities and knowledge 
to the advantage of the man he serves and to 
make full disclosure of all facts which his 
principal should know in transacting the 
business. Failure to discharge such duty with 
reasonable diligence and care precludes his 
recovery for the service he purports to be 
rendering. 329 P.2d at 412. 
This duty to the Joneses was breached by Oberhansly's fraudu-
lent or reckless conduct resulting in the Joneses purchasing 
property otherwise would not have purchased if the true facts had 
been known. (Tr. 171) The Joneses were damaged because they 
bargained for 22 3/4 acres but received less than seven acres. 
Consequently, they were prevented from building a home for at 
least three years after the purchase of the property. (P. Ex. 9) 
The Joneses were further damaged in not obtaining a parcel of 
land large enough to construct an affiliated campground as they 
had intended. 
POINT V. 
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD AND MIS-
REPRESENTATION WERE PLEAD AND PROVED BY 
THE APPELLANTS 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, 
intent, knowledge and other condition of 
mind of a person may be averred generally. 
-22-
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The circumstances constituting fraud were stated with par-
ticularity in Court I, paragraphs 2 through 10 of Amended Counter-
claim and Third-Party Complaint and later incorporated by refer-
ence in the remaining counts of said Amended Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint. 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is the same as its 
counterpart in the Federal rules. In Law of Federal Courts, 
Wright, Zd Edition, it states: 
Rule 9 contains special provisions, which 
are largely self-explanatory, as to plead-
ing such matters as capacity, fraud or 
other condition of mind, conditions pre-
cedent, official document or act, judgment, 
time and place, and special damage. Of 
these provisions, the only one that has 
given any difficulty is Rule 9(b), which 
says that in all averments of fraud or mis-
take, the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake shall be stated with par-
ticularity. Occasional cases have read this 
as if it were in a vacuum, and have given 
it a strict application that fails to take 
into account the general simplicity of 
pleadings contemplated by the rules. 
Rule 9(b) must be read in the light of 
Rule S(a). While fraud must be particu-
larized, the allegations must be as short, 
plain, simple concise, and direct as is 
reasonable under the circumstances. If the 
allegations of fraud are not sufficiently 
particularized, the remedy is not to dis-
miss the complaint, but to require a more 
definite statement or to permit defendant 
to ascertain the facts by discovery. In 
these special matters, as generally, the 
aim of the rules to de-emphasize the plead-
ings and to try the case on the proofs 
must be kept in mind. 
-23-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Moore's Federal Practice, it is stated: 
In non-federal matters, of course, the ele-
ments of fraud are now determined by state law. 
For example, in some states the third element 
(scienter) may not be required. Subject to 
this qualification, all of these elements 
should appear in a well-pleaded averment of 
fraud, and in addition 'the circumstances con-
stituting fraud' must be stated with par-
ticularity. Normally this means that the 
pleader must state the time, place and con-
tent of the false misrepresentation, the facts 
misrepresented and what was obtained or given 
up as a consequence of the fraud. 
In Pace vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, (1952) the 
Utah Supreme Court set out the essential elements of fraud and 
misrepresentation: 
This being an action in deceit based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden 
was upon plaintiffs to prove all of the 
essential elements thereof. These are: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, 
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to 
his injury and damage. 
Pursuant to these requirements, paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of 
Count I of the Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (R. 
-24-
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113) detail the representations made of presently-existing 
material facts, that is the amount of acreage and the release of 
the acre of ground for the building lot. These representations 
were false. (Tr. 95, 211) At the trial, there was no question 
that these representations were made or that they were false. 
(Tr. 89, 63) Dugan and Oberhansly admitted to these represen-
tations. (Tr. 49, 63, 210, 211) 
In a land purchase, whether there is 22 3/4 acres or in 
reality less than 7 acres is an obvious material fact. The 
Dugans, as testified, have bought and sold large amounts of 
acreage in the Vernal area for many years and would know whether 
they had almost 23 acres or less than 7 acres, or whether they 
had 18 acres tillable or 8 acres irrigated. 
Oberhansly has worked the last 8 years as a real estate 
agent for a company that specifically specializes in farm, ranch 
and recreational property. The information contained in the 
listing and the accompanying national advertisement was given by 
him based on representations made by Dugan and his own inspection 
of the property. (Tr. 59, 60, 205) 
Oberhansly knew of their falsity or else made them reck-
lessly without sufficient knowledge. It is apparent that Oberhansly 
~ew that the Dugans had not agreed to release a building lot 
from the acreage, yet he said that they had agreed knowing that 
the Joneses would not purchase this property without such an 
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agreement; (Tr. 69, 211) therefore, inducing the Joneses to 
return the amended Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale, thereby' 
going ahead with the purchase. (Tr. 116 117) 
The Joneses were unaware of the falsities of the representa-
tions made by Dugan and Oberhansly (Tr. 121, 132) and in fact 
relied on them to make their purchase, a purchase which would not 
have been made if they had known of any single untrue represen-
tation. (Tr. 101, 108) 
A bank appraisal was done on the building on the property as 
to their value in 1973 the year of purchase. (Tr. 193) Based on 
this, Betty Jones testified that the buildings were worth at best 
approxiately $12,000. (Tr. 135) 
In subtracting this $12,000 figure from the $50,000 purchase 
price, one is left with $38,000 as to the price of the land 
purchased. Dividing it by the 22 3/4 acres contracted to be 
sold, a price per acre of $1,670.33 is attained. 
Carl Dugan himself, in an attempt to refute the Joneses' 
testimony, testified that the acreage without the building should 
have been valued at $10,000 by stating the store and other build· 
ings were worth $40,000 at the time of the sale. (Tr. 246) Even 
using this questionable figure, one is given a figure of $1,666.66 
price per acre by dividing by the actual acreage figure of 6 
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66 
acres which Dugan testified was the amount he knew was conveyed. 
(Tr. 37) The unrefuted testimony at trial was that the Joneses 
were shorted approximately 16 acres. At the figure of $1,670.33 
per acre, the damage for the missing acreage would be $26,725.28; 
even using Dugan's own figures testified at court, the Joneses' 
damage for the missing 16 acres is $26,666.56. 
CONCLUSION 
A party bringing counterclaims and third-party claims raising 
factual questions in causes of action traditionally cognizable at 
law is entitled to a jury trial. This right to jury trial is 
protected by the Constitution of Utah as well as Utah statutes and 
judicial decisions. 
An oral pre-trial order should not disallow presenting expert 
testimony as to the value of property. Excluding such testimony 
constitutes a manifest injustice particularly when the opposing 
party presents testimony as to the value of property and no re-
buttal testimony is allowed. 
An owner of property is competent to testify as to the value of 
property. 
Real estate brokers or salesmen owe a duty to buyers. When 
this duty is breached by the fraud, misrepresentation or negli-
gence of the broker or salesman, the broker or salesman is liable 
to the buyer. 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The foreclosure ordered by the District Court was improper. 
The judgment of the District Court should, therefore, be reversed. 
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the District 
Court for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of June, 1979. 
ent Ho land 
H SON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellants 
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